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One of Veber's Unanswered
Questions: How Much Prior
Discrimination Justifies Voluntary
Preferential Affirmative Action?
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most power-
ful.1
It is by now well understood, however, that our society cannot be
completely colorblind in the short term if we are to have a color-
blind society in the long term. After centuries of vewing through
colored lenses, eyes do not quickly adjust when the lenses are re-
moved. Discrimination has a way of perpetuating itself, albeit un-
intentionally, because the resulting inequalities make new
opportunities less accessible. Preferential treatment is one partial
prescription to remedy our society's most intransigent and deeply
rooted inequalities.2
I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 prohibits an employer 4
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority
upheld a Louisiana statute requiring railway companies to provide separate, but equal, facili-
ties for white and Black passengers. Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter, found the statute viola-
tive of both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Maintaining that the Louisiana
legislature enacted the statute in order to humiliate citizens of a particular race, Justice Harlan
inferred intentional discrimination from a seemingly neutral legislative utterance. He then
condemned the statute as an arbitrary and unreasonable abrogation of the "equality of rights"
and "personal liberty" constitutionally guaranteed to all citizens. Id. at 555. Justice Harlan's
assumption that the Louisiana legislature was discriminatorily motivated foreshadows recent
trends under Title VII in which the employer's intent to discriminate is inferred from the
results of his employment practices. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
2. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 957 (1974). In a unanimous decision, the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts pro-
gram requiring contractors with state contracts to employ a specified percentage of minority
workers. Supporting this legislative prescription of "special treatment" for qualified minority
workers, the court concluded that past discrimination against minorities in the construction
industry should be rectified by current preferential practices designed to assure an industry-
wide equilibrium of "equal opportunity." Id. at 18.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1974).
4. Pursuant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the coverage of Title
VII was radically expanded. In its present state, Title VII applies to employers with 15 or
more employees who have worked at least 20 calendar weeks in the year of or preceding the
action or suit. In addition, Title VII now encompasses state and local governments. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-2611, 86 Stat. 103 [codified at 42 U.S.C.
from discriminating' against any individual on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.6 Broadly designed to dissolve
all "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers"7 to both public
and private employment,' Title VII authorizes two discrete avenues
of attack. First, Title VII empowers the courts with much prescrip-
tive discretion9 to remedy both current employment discrimination
and the deliberate perpetuation of past discrimination."° Second, Ti-
§§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1974)]. This latter development has brought Title VII into direct conflict
with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The growing body of Title VII
case law reveals a more open-ended definition of discrimination than that required by equal
protection standards. Compare Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977),
with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Supreme Court has not yet delineated the
priorities established by these two divergent interpretations of discrimination but has inti-
mated that the two are clearly not congruent. See Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (the
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from insurance coverage was justified by a rational
relations test under equal protection even though coverage was required under similar pro-
grams implemented pursuant to Title VII).
5. Title VII does not contain a definition of discrimination. This omission was vehe-
mently criticized by members of Congress who opposed enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Senator Stennis protested that, "The bill, throughout, fails to define the word 'discrimi-
nation'; but the title of the bill clearly states that its purpose is to prohibit discrimination." 110
CONG. REC. 5875 (1964). Similarly, Senator Robertson maintained that, "Enforcement will
become as difficult as the enforcement of national prohibition under the Volstead Act." 110
CONG. REC. 5933 (1964). In general, opponents of the bill feared that it delegated too much
legislative authority to the executive enforcement agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 5863 (remarks of Sen. Eastland). See United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1974). The precise word-
ing of this section suggests that Title VII can be used to challenge discrimination against both
minorities and non-minorities:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. Indeed, many non-minority complainants in Title VII suits have explicitly relied on
§ 703(a). See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1004 (E.D. Mich.
1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2277 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1979) (in light of Weber). But see United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2723-24 (1979) (this section, interpreted in terms of Title
VII's historical context, cannot be applied literally to prohibit all voluntary affirmative action).
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
8. See note 4 supra. Although Title VII now expressly covers state and local govern-
ments, the federal government remains subject to the Civil Service Commission. See, e.g.,
Hunter & Branch, Equal Employment Opportunities." Administrative Procedures and Judicial De-
velopments Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nityAct of 1972, 18 How. L.J. 543, 545-47 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (federal courts may
fashion such relief as the circumstances of a case require); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975) (courts may invoke novel remedies in order to fully compensate the victims of
employment discrimination).
10. Although Title VII does not purport to remedy discrimination occurring prior to its
effective date, its coverage does extend to post-Act practices that perpetuate the effects of pre-
Act discrimination. For example, Title VII could not remedy the effects of discriminatory job
assignment practices utilized by an employer in 1963; Title VII could, however, remedy the
effects of a 1965 ban on inter-departmental transfers that effectively froze minorities in the
undesirable job assignments. The 1965 transfer ban, although neutral on its face, may be
tie VII actively encourages employers to voluntarily initiate affirma-
tive action schemes;" l cooperation and voluntary compliance
represent the "preferred means" of achieving Title VII goals.'2
By proscribing any discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,' 3 Title VII expressly encompasses
reverse discrimination' 4 as well as discrimination against recognized
minorities.' 5 Concomitantly, section 7030) specifically prohibits one
form of reverse discrimination; this section censures court-ordered
preferential treatment designed to alleviate minority under-
representation in the work force that did not result from prior dis-
crimination against that minority group.' 6  Subsequent case law
proscribed as the intentional perpetuation of prior discrimination. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
I1. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aj'd, 556
F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
12. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). Accord, United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (con-
sent decrees, adopted subsequent to a Title VII action brought against an employer, should be
interfered with on review only if the district judge clearly abused his discretion by approving
the settlement).
13. See note 6 and accompanying text supra for the exact language of the relevant sec-
tion.
14. Reverse discrimination refers to the use of racial or sexual criteria, in a manner detri-
mental to the majority, to rectify the perceived effects of past discrimination against minorities.
In effect, reverse discrimination consists of "a majority's discriminating against itself." Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 741 (1974).
15. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). In McDonald one
Black and two white employees were charged by defendant company with the misappropria-
tion of certain cargo. The company discharged the white employees but retained the Black
worker. Finding the company's discriminatory practice violative of Title VII, the Court held
that Title VII proscribes racial discrimination against whites to the same extent it proscribes
racial discrimination against Blacks. Id. at 278-79. Significantly, McDonald does not deal
with discrimination against whites in an affirmative action context. For a general discussion of
the implications of the case, see 10 AKRON L. REV. 570 (1977).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1974). The exact wording
of § 7030) must be carefully examined in order to arrive at an accurate interpretation:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individ-
ua or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employ-
ment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any la-
bor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or
other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other
area.
Id. It is important to note that § 7030) bears two inherent limitations. First, this section ad-
dresses only court-ordered programs and does not proscribe an employer's voluntary efforts to
rectify a perceived imbalance in his work force. Second, § 703(j) prohibits preferential treat-
ment only when the sole purpose of that treatment is to counteract an imbalanced work force.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Obviously, a statistical imbalance can
indicate the presence of discriminatory practices. Thus, although a court may not remedy a
mere imbalance, it may remedy the discrimination that this imbalance symbolizes:
[Ilmbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it
is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result
establishes, however, that the "make whole" objective 7 of Title VII
permits certain discriminatory practices implemented to correct the
current presence of discrimination 8 or the perpetuation of prior dis-
crimination. 9
In the first fifteen years of Title VII's existence, the Supreme
Court has had many opportunities to examine the potentially dis-
criminatory effects on the majority of court-ordered affirmative ac-
tion programs. 20  Employers, appealing from the imposition of
judicial remedies, have assured that the permissible boundaries of
court-ordered preferential programs are well-delineated; numerous
decisions have established the type and degree of prior discrimina-
tion necessary to satisfy the requirements of Title VII and justify the
invocation of a preferential remedy.2'
Unlike court-ordered programs, voluntary programs have, until
recent years, received little judicial scrutiny. In the absence of defin-
itive Supreme Court guidance, those circuit and district courts that
did face reverse discrimination claims adhered to divergent, often
contradictory standards. Some courts22 relied heavily on congres-
sional programs23 and executive orders 24 that recognize a pervasive
in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the
population in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of longlast-
ing and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the
general population thus may be significant even though § 7 036) makes clear that
Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977). Accord, Ha-
zelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfit-
ters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n
Steamfitters, 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Hazelwood further clarifies the scope of the
permissible inference: a disparity between the percentage of minorities in a particular job clas-
sification and the percentage of qualified minorities in the community is often revelatory of
discriminatory employment practices. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
17. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). In Albemarle, the Court
concluded, that "the purpose of Title VII [is] to make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination." Id.
18. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (dis-
crimination in hiring); Sweeney v. Bd. of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), vacated and re-
mandedper curiam, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978) (promotional discrimination); Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1379 (1979) (dis-
criminatory height requirement).
19. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (dis-
criminatory effects of seniority system); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)
(discriminatory effects of seniority system); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(high school degree requirement perpetuates discriminatory effects of inferior, segregated
schools).
20. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
21. See notes 45-65 and accompanying text infra.
22. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1978);
EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976), a#'d, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Barnett v. International Harvester, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,846
(W.D. Tenn. 1976). Cf. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972) (persons benefitted by remedial program not required to be the specific victims
of prior discrimination).
23. See, e.g., the minority business enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment
history of discrimination in a certain industry or field25 and urged
the creation of affirmative action programs. These courts applauded
voluntary affirmative action efforts designed solely to rectify per-
ceived imbalances in the work force and did not require that the
employer specifically admit prior discrimination.26 On the other end
of the spectrum, some courts2 7 allowed only court-ordered preferen-
tial programs under Title VII, maintaining that the anti-preferential
treatment stricture of section 7030) served as a "clear prohibition"28
to voluntary implementation of discriminatory affirmative action
programs.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber2 9 the Supreme Court enunci-
ated its long-awaited stance on voluntary affirmative action. Plain-
tiff, a white male, was denied participation in an on-the-job training
program for crafts positions at defendant Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation's Gramercy, Louisiana plant. Kaiser had re-
served half the available positions for Black employees in an attempt
to rectify both the effects of the historical exclusion of Blacks from
crafts professions30 and a severe underrepresentation 3t of Blacks in
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (West Supp. 1979). See notes 91-94 and accompanying text in-
fra.
24. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1976) (prohibiting contractors on federally financed
projects from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Exec.
Order No. 10,975, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (prohibiting contractors on federally financed
projects from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin).
25. Executive Order 11,246, for example, recognizes "a policy of the United States Gov-
ernment to remedy the discrimination practiced in the past by government contractors in the
hiring of minority employees." Barnett v. International Harvester, I I Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,846
(W.D. Tenn. 1976). Acknowledging that "much has been accomplished through positive
agency programs to assure equality of opportunity," the executive order maintains that
"[aidditional steps, however, are called for in order to strengthen and assure fully equal em-
ployment opportunity in the Federal Government." Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803
(1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1976).
26. A general executive or congressional finding of discrimination in the industry serves
as an admission of prior discrimination sufficient to justify specific remedial action. See
Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 572 F.2d
1258 (8th Cir. 1978).
27. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2277 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1979) (in light of Weber); Chmill v. Pittsburgh, 31
Pa. Commw. Ct. 98, 375 A.2d 841 (1977).
28. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2277 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1979) (in light of Weber). In this reverse discrimina-
tion suit brought by white police officers challenging defendant's preferential promotional
practices, the lower court rejected defendant's statistical evidence of prior discrimination.
Maintaining that defendant was in the best position to produce concrete evidence of its alleged
discrimination against Blacks, the court held that the affirmative action program was merely
an attempt at racial balancing. Id. at 1004-05. But see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct.
2721, 2731 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (employer may hesitate to produce concrete evi-
dence of its prior discrimination because it does not want to encourage minority claims for
backpay).
29. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
30. Id. at 2725 n. 1. The Court found that, "Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on
racial grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice."
Id.
crafts positions in the Kaiser work force.32 Several of the minority
employees accepted in the program had less requisite seniority than
plaintiff.
The Fifth Circuit refused to condone Kaiser's affirmative action
program since the employer failed to prove that it had specifically
discriminated in the past.33 The court explicitly rejected the sugges-
tion that a preferential affirmative action program could be insti-
tuted solely to remedy general societal or historical discrimination,
even though that legacy of discrimination was well documented
34
and recognized by executive order.35 Similarly, the court was un-
moved by Kaiser's evidence of minority underrepresentation, hold-
ing that a bare statistical disparity, in the absence of proof of actual
discrimination, could not justify the voluntary implementation of a
preferential affirmative action program.36
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, forcefully upheld the va-
lidity of voluntary affirmative action, maintaining that both the leg-
islative history of Title VII37 and the inherent limitations of section
7030)38 indicate approval of voluntary preferential programs. In ex-
amining the boundaries of voluntary affirmative action, Justice
Brennan declined to "define in detail the line of demarcation be-
tween permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. 39 In-
stead, Justice Brennan enumerated four factors that conjunctively
justified the Kaiser program. Concerning the scope of the program,
31. Although Blacks constituted approximately 39% of the work force in the area sur-
rounding Kaiser's plant, Blacks comprised only 1.83% of the skilled craft workers at the plant.
Id. at 2725.
32. Kaiser also argued that its affirmative action program, which resulted from a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with United Steelworkers, was instituted to comply with Executive
Order 11,246 and its recognition of the historical exclusion of Blacks from various industries.
See Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 15-16, United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the merits
of this contention. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
33. Few employers would, however, be willing to admit specific instances of prior dis-
crimination since, by doing so, they are "strongly inviting private suits by blacks." Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 231 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting),
rev'dsub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). An employer might very
well decline to embrace this sort of "Pyrrhic victory," preferring to abandon efforts at volun-
tary affirmative action. Id. Ultimately, the minority employees, "the only people potentially
interested in showing past discrimination," would emerge as the unequivocal losers in the
action. Id.
34. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
35. See notes 81-88 and accompanying text infra.
36. 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.
Ct. 2721 (1979).
37. Justice Brennan found that the legislature's purpose in enacting Title VII was to in-
crease employment opportunities for minorities, preferably by means of voluntary efforts.
Similarly, § 7036) was specifically limited to court-ordered remedies. The dissent, however,
vehemently maintained that the legislative background of Title VII indicated an intent to pro-
hibit all voluntary preferential treatment. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
38. See note 16 supra.
39. 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979).
Justice Brennan noted that Kaiser's plan did not "unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees"''4 by requiring their
discharge; in addition, Kaiser intended to utilize affirmative action
as a temporary measure and planned to abandon the program when
the desired racial balance was achieved. Concerning the extent of
the prior discrimination the program was designed to rectify, Justice
Brennan indicated that the plan responded to "conspicuous racial
imbalance"'" in the Kaiser work force; furthermore, the crafts posi-
tions affected represented "traditionally segregated job categories.
42
Although Weber answers any doubts concerning the basic legal-
ity of voluntary affirmative action under Title VII, it also leaves
many problems unresolved. Specifically, Weber fails to delineate,
beyond its own facts, the type and extent of prior discrimination jus-
tifying preferential treatment. Future decisions will be necessary to
chart the exact "line of demarcation" separating permissible affirma-
tive action from impermissible reverse discrimination. Several areas
of the law do, however, provide some insight into the probable loca-
tion of this boundary: the degree of prior discrimination requiring a
court-ordered remedy, executive orders designed to supplement Title
VII, and Supreme Court dicta concerning Title VII intimate that the
scope of voluntary affirmative action is broad.
II. What Title VII Requires: Discriminatioh Justifying Remedial
Action by the Courts
Weber stresses the distinct Title VII standards governing volun-
tary and court-ordered affirmative action programs. In order to pro-
tect "traditional business freedom," Congress intended to preserve,
as much as possible, an employer's "management prerogatives.
4 3
Consequently, Title VII hesitates to require affirmative action but
liberally permits voluntary efforts. Logically, the requirement of
prior discrimination justifying voluntary affirmative action cannot be
more stringent than the requirement of prior discrimination that ne-




43. Id. at 2729.
44. In his concurring opinion in Weber, Justice Blackmun argued that these two stan-
dards should closely approximate each other. Thus, an employer could justify a voluntary
preferential program by proving an "arguable violation" of Title VII. This approach has obvi-
ous advantages: "It responds to a practical problem in the administration of Title VII not
anticipated by Congress [reverse discrimination]. It draws predictability from the outline of
present law, and closely effectuates the purpose of the Act." Id. at 2732. Unfortunately, this
standard forces the employer into the perilous position of admitting enough discrimination to
establish an arguable violation, but not enough to encourage discrimination suits by minori-
ties. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting), rev'dsub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). See note 33
.s.upra.
VII's evolving definition of discrimination reveals some of that terri-
tory clearly located on the permissible side of Weber's line of demar-
cation.
Since its emergence in 1964, Title VII has undergone much in-
terpretation, clarification, and refinement. Particularly, two basic ev-
identiary approaches toward the concept of discrimination have
developed: both the disparate impact and the disparate treatment
theories provide means by which an aggrieved party may prove a
prima facie violation of Title VII. A brief examination of the, history
and development of each of these theories reveals a trend toward a
relaxed burden of proof.
A. Disparate Impact
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company45 the Supreme Court articu-
lated one method46 by which a prima facie violation of Title VII can
be established. Holding that defendant employer's high school de-
gree requirement and its use of intelligence tests discriminated
against potential Black employees, the Court asserted that "practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practice. 47 Under Griggs,
concern with the ultimate results of an employer's actions supercedes
concern with his intentions:48 "Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the mo-
tivation. 49
B. Disparate Treatment
Two years after Griggs v. Duke Power Company,"° the Supreme
Court complemented the disparate impact approach with an addi-
tional, seemingly more stringent, method of determining a Title VII
violation." In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green52 the
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Note,
Employment Testing. The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900
(1972).
46. Griggs deals specifically with employment practices that perpetuate prior discrimina-
tion. These practices are themselves discriminatory only within a specific context. For exam-
ple, the high school degree requirement utilized by Duke Power Company derives its
discriminatory effect from the segregated Southern school system; in the absence of prior edu-
cational inequalities, the degree requirement is a permissible non-discriminatory employment
qualification. 401 U.S. at 429-30.
47. 401 U.S. at 430.
48. The employer can, however, justify the employment practice by showing that a legiti-
mate business purpose necessitates its use. Thus, testing or other hiring procedures that "de-
monstrably ' prove "a reasonable measure of job performance" will withstand a disparate
impact attack. 401 U.S. at 436.
49. Id. at 432 (italicized in original).
50. Id.
51. In a disparate impact situation, an employment practice that is facially neutral is
Supreme Court delineated four elements requisite to establish a
prima facie case of "pattern or practice"53 discrimination. Under the
disparate treatment theory, the complainant must prove the follow-
ing: first, that he belongs to a racial minority; second, that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking ap-
plicants; third, that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; last,
that after his rejection the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifi-
cations.54
Upon proof of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to present a non-discriminatory justification for the rejec-
tion.55 This justification may then be challenged by the complainant
who must prove that the reason asserted for his rejection was actu-
ally a pretext. In determining the pretextual nature of a justification,
the court may consider such relevant evidence as the employer's gen-
eral policy and practice, the employer's prior treatment of the com-
plainant, and statistics.
56
Although proof of the employer's discriminatory motive is an
essential element in a disparate treatment case, recent Supreme
challenged because it falls more harshly on one group than another and is not justified by
business necessity. In a disparate treatment situation, the employer has intentionally treated
some persons less favorably than others on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Either theory may be applied to a particular factual situation. International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
52. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Seegenerall, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. 654 (1974).
53. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1974). This section autho-
rizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any individual engaged in a pattern
or practice inhibitive of Title VII rights. Id. A "pattern or practice" of discriminatory conduct
consists of acts of discrimination that are not "isolated, peculiar or accidental" events. United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971).
54. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
55. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The employer must merely
prove that he based his decision on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, not that he imple-
mented the best possible system for the utilization of minorities. Id. In Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978) (per curiam), the Court emphasized that the employer need not
prove absence of discriminatory motive at this stage to dispel a prima facie case. Id. On the
other hand, however, the employer must present more than mere "affirmations of good faith."
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343 n.24 (1977).
56. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-06 (1973). See also Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 339-40 n.20 (1977). The
Supreme Court has been receptive to the use of statistical evidence to prove a Title VII viola-
tion since statistics often constitute "the only available avenue of proof... to uncover clan-
destine and covert discrimination by the employer or union involved." United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971), cited with
approval in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
The employer has, at this point, an additional opportunity to rebut the proof of discrimi-
natory intent by establishing that a legitimate business purpose justified the action. See
Woods v. Safeway Stores, 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'dper curiam, 579 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1267 (1979). "The business purpose must be sufficiently
compelling to override any racial impact. . . and there must be available no acceptable alter-
native policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced."
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dirmirsed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
Court decisions confirm that motive can be inferred from a statistical
imbalance between the percentage of minorities in a particular job
classification and the percentage of qualified minorities in the com-
munity.57 In Hazelwood School District v. United States58 the com-
plainant was able to prove a school district's discriminatory motive
by means of a statistical imbalance between the percentage of Black
teachers actually employed by the school district and the percentage
of qualified Black teachers in the relevant labor market area. The
Court held that gross statistical disparities, unsupported by specific
instances of alleged discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, can
nevertheless constitute prima facie proof of a violation.59
In this sense, the Hazelwood Court traversed the distance
between Griggs and McDonnell Douglas: motive, requisite to prove
disparate treatment, may now be inferred from consequences, the
hallmark of disparate impact. The necessity of this inference draws
support from two interrelated considerations. First, an employee
cannot easily produce direct evidence of an employer's motivation.
Were he required to meet such a stringent burden of proof complain-
ant would be "necessarily doomed to failure."6 Second, an em-
ployer may deliberately attempt to conceal his discriminatory
motives, masking actual intent behind a well-conceived facade.6
In another sense, however, Hazelwood severely undermines
Griggs. Griggs proscribes the perpetuation of pre-Act discrimination
by unintentionally discriminatory post-Act practices. In doing so,
Griggs implicitly reflects a series of cases encouraging the liberal use
of post-Act statistics to prove the present discriminatory impact of
pre-Act practices.62 Under this approach, Title VII may be used, in
57. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Although § 7030) establishes that Title VII
does not require a balanced work force, "imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful dis-
crimination." 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20. See Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' Int'l, 577 F.2d 1135
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 871 (1979).
58. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). See generally 21 How. L.J. 677 (1978).
59. 433 U.S. at 307-08. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339 (1977). A recent circuit court case reaffirmed this position by holding that a substan-
tial statistical disparity in promotion rates of males and females established a prima facie vio-
lation of Title VII. Davis v. Calfano, 48 U.S.L.W. 2339 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 1979).
60. Sweeney v. Bd. of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978).
61. See United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971). In fact, the employer may not be conscious of his true motivations. For
example, an employer's latent prejudices, channelled through a subjective hiring process,
could result in statistical imbalances unsupported by identifiable instances of intentional dis-
crimination. That many white Americans still harbor such prejudices against Blacks has been
conclusively determined. Williams, A New RacialPoll, NEWSWEEK, February 26, 1979, at 48-
53.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (union's pre-Act discriminatory practices, coupled with post-
Act absence of Black members, constitutes Title VII violation); Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (discriminatory pre-
Act job assignments, exacerbated by no-transfer policy, violative of Title VII); Local 189,
effect, to rectify discrimination occurring before the effective date of
the Act. Thus, minority applicants subjected to pre-Act hiring dis-
crimination or minority employees subjected to pre-Act promotional
discrimination are entitled to post-Act relief.63 Hazelwood, however,
rebukes this temporally expansive use of Title VII by holding that a
public employer who, after the effective date of the 1972 amend-
ment, "made all its employment decisions in a wholly nondiscrimi-
natory way would not violate Title VII even if it had formerly
maintained an all-white work force by purposefully excluding Ne-
groes."' Conceding that pre-Act practices have some bearing on
post-Act realities, the Hazelwood Court admitted that pre-Act dis-
crimination "might in some circumstances support the inference that
such discrimination continued. 65
In its present state, the Title VII concept of discrimination
manifests itself in two distinct dimensions. Conceptually, discrimi-
nation is an expansive term. The requisite intent may be liberally
inferred from a variety of external factors, such as pre-Act practices
and present statistical imbalances. Temporally, however, discrimi-
nation is limited in scope: Title VII proscribes only post-Act discrim-
inatory practices.
III. What Title VII Permits: Discrimination Justifying Voluntary
Action
In United Steelworkers v. Weber 66 the Supreme Court avoided
delineating the boundaries of voluntary affirmative action by identi-
fying only certain conduct clearly permitted and certain conduct
clearly prohibited. On one hand, the conspicuous racial imbalance
in Kaiser's work force and the traditionally segregated nature of the
job classifications involved justified Kaiser's preferential treatment.
On the other hand, the Weber Court expressly prohibited one moti-
vation for preferential treatment; an employer may not utilize affirm-
ative action solely to "maintain racial balance" 67 after manifest
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970) (post-Act seniority system, giving preference to those who worked at job classification
previously predominated by whites, violated Title VII); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (effects of pre-Act departmental reorganization on racially segre-
gated basis perpetuated by restrictions on departmental transfers). But see International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (a bona fide seniority system, protected by
§ 703(h), cannot be banned merely because it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination).
63. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
64. 433 U.S. at 309.
65. Id. at 309-10 n.15.
66. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
67. Id. at 2730. This prohibition is not comparable to § 703(j), which states that a court
may not order an employer to remedy a mere imbalance in the absence of prior discrimina-
tion. The Weber Court might allow an employer voluntarily to remedy an imbalance. The
Weber Court would not, however, permit the employer to continue to utilize racial preference
to maintain balance after imbalance is corrected.
imbalance is rectified.
An examination of each of these three motivations for affirma-
tive action indicates the Supreme Court's probable reaction to pref-
erential programs based on lesser findings of prior discrimination.
Viewed in terms of Title VII's requirements, 68 relevant executive or-
ders,69 and Supreme Court dicta,7° either statistical imbalance or his-
torical discrimination, standing alone, appears to justify voluntary
preferential treatment. Similarly, a program that tends to maintain
statistical balance may, under some circumstances, be permissible.
A. Voluntary Programs Based on Statistical Disparities
Logic dictates that the permissible scope of voluntary action
under Title VII equals or exceeds the Act's minimum require-
ments.71 Concomitantly, bare statistical disparities, utilized to estab-
lish pattern or practice discrimination in such cases as Hazelwood
School District v. United States72 and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,73 must sufficiently justify voluntary pref-
erential programs even in the absence of historical discrimination in
the specific industry or job classification involved. In Hazelwood, for
example, the Court dealt exclusively with a statistical comparison of
Black teachers hired by defendant school district and Black teachers
in the relevant labor market area; significantly, the Court never sug-
gested that Black teachers were the historical victims of discrimina-
tion.74
One major difference separates the use of statistics in Weber
and Hazelwood. Although the Hazelwood statistics were ultimately
used to create an inference of intentional discrimination, the Weber
Court carefully refrained from intimating that Kaiser had intention-
ally discriminated. This distinction is mitigated by a consideration
of the disparate impact theory. Griggs v. Duke Power Company
75
confirms that Title VII does not necessarily require an intent to dis-
criminate. Concomitantly, voluntary affirmative action would be se-
verely undermined were the employer required to prove intentional
discrimination since few employers would choose to provide minori-
ties with sufficient information to bring backpay claims.
68. See notes 45-65 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 81-88 and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 89-90, 95-99 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
72. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
73. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
74. In fact, the city of St. Louis, which the government argued should be included in the
relevant labor market area, attempted to maintain a 50% Black teaching staff. Thus, at least in
terms of the surrounding geographic area, teachers did not constitute a segregated job classifi-
cation.
75. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
B. Voluntary Programs Based on Industry- Wide, Historical
Discrimination
In addition to noting the statistical disparity between the Kaiser
work force and available Blacks in the labor market, the Weber
Court carefully documented the historical exclusion of Blacks from
crafts positions.7 6 In the absence of discriminatory impact or treat-
ment perpetrated by defendant employer, Title VII has never re-
quired a remedy for general historical discrimination in an industry.
Several executive orders77 and congressional programs78 do, how-
ever, mandate that certain affirmative steps be taken to rectify indus-
try-wide discrimination. An examination of two of these
programs-Executive Order 11,24679 and the minority business en-
terprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act 8° -indicates
that Title VII permits, but does not require, remedial efforts directed
at historical discrimination.
. Executive Order 11,246.-Enacted in 1969 by President
Johnson, Executive Order 11,246 consciously parallels Title VII.81
76. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
77. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1976); Exec. Order No. 10,975, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
78. See, e.g., the minority business enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (West Supp. 1979).
79. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-
1970), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note
(1976).
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (West Supp. 1979).
81. See, e.g., Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive
Power, 39 U. CHi. L. REV. 723 (1972); Note, The Philadelhia Plan: Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity in the Construction Trades, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 187 (1970); Note, Executive
Order 11246" Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 590
(1969). Much debate currently centers around the potential contradiction between the quota
system necessitated by the executive order and the anti-preferential treatment stricture of
§ 7030) of Title VII. Courts have not consistently accepted the executive order. See, e.g.,
Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and re-
manded, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978) (anti-preferential limitation of Title VII invalidates Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246); Mele v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975) (quota
prohibition of Title VII applies only to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and not to Executive Order
11,246); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970) (Executive Order 11,246 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not conflict in any way).
The circuit court in Weber refused to obey the executive order. Relying on the three
categories of executive orders delineated by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the Weber court placed the
executive order in Justice Jackson's third, least protected, category. In this category, the Presi-
dent's power is limited and his actions must be carefully scrutinized if he acts at variance with
the express or implied will of Congress. Id. Thus, the Weber court held that "in the absence of
any prior hiring orpromotion discrimination the executive order must fall." (Italics in original).
563 F.2d at 227.
As analyzed in note 16 supra, however, § 7030) proscribes only quotas imposed solely to
rectify a statistical imbalance. The executive order, predicated on an industry-wide finding of
prior discrimination, urges remedial action. Thus, compliance with the executive order does
not contravene § 7030).
In addition, Congress, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, refised to limit presidential
power in that it did not limit the applicability of any executive orders to the Act. This refusal
This executive order provides that every government contract con-
tain an enforceable antidiscrimination clause preventing all recipi-
ents of federal contracts from discriminating against any employee
or applicant on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Clearly intended to complement Title VII, the executive order
manifests specific federal concern with the long history of discrimi-
nation against minorities in the construction industry.8 2 By recog-
nizing this history of discrimination, the executive order makes a
finding of prior discrimination analagous to that required under Ti-
tle VII to justify the implementation of a preferential affirmative ac-
83tion program. In addition, Executive Order 11,246 suggests that
proof of prior discrimination can be established without identifying
specific victims. 84 The executive order, basing its remedial authority
on a general finding of industry-wide discrimination, neither re-
quires the employer to admit intentional discrimination nor requires
him to prove statistical disparities.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber Justice Brennan specifically de-
clined to discuss Executive Order 11,246,85 maintaining that suffi-
cient evidence of prior discrimination obviated a consideration of
the executive order. The executive order did, however, merit some
attention in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,86 a re-
verse discrimination suit decided on equal protection principles.
Justice Powell, writing the majority judgment, analogized the volun-
tary affirmative action program that regulated professional school
admissions in Bakke to Title VII preferential programs. Citing Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246 with approval, Justice Powell emphasized that
the executive order was designed to combat previous discrimination
extends tacit approval to supplementary executive actions. See, e.g., Comment, The Philadel-
phia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 737-38 (1972).
See note 85 infra.
82. See, e.g., Note, The Philadelphia Plan: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construc-
tion Trades, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 187, 196-203 (1970).
83. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
84. Cf. Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976) (industry-wide historical discrimination can have pervasive
effects); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (the
specific victims of discrimination need not be identified under Title VII as long as statistics
establish an inference of discriminatory intent).
85. 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 n.9 (1979).
86. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Alan Bakke, a white male denied admission to the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis, alleged that a minority quota program vio-
lated his rights under both equal protection and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Four
Justices sustained Bakke's claim on Title VI grounds. The remaining Justices held that Title
VI did not provide Bakke with a private cause of action. Four of these Justices found that the
admissions program did not contravene equal protection, in that the medical school's desire to
rectify the effects of past societal discrimination against minorities constituted an important
governmental goal. Justice Powell, writing the pivotal opinion, subjected the program to strict
scrutiny and determined that it was violative of equal protection. See The Supreme Court, 1977
Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 131 (1978). Significantly, equal protection, unlike Title VII, has
always required intentional discrimination in order to afford relief. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
in the construction industry.87 Similarly, Justice Brennan, in a con-
curring opinion joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
stressed the validity of the executive order."8 Additionally, the Bren-
nan group expressed satisfaction with any affirmative action pro-
gram designed to alleviate historical discrimination in an industry or
field:89 "Although Title VII clearly does not require employers to
take action to remedy the disadvantages imposed upon racial minor-
ities by hands other than their own, such an objective is perfectly
consistent with the remedial goals of the statute."9
2 The minority business enterpriseprovision of the Public Works
Employment Act.-Like Executive Order 11,246, this provision 9' ac-
cords preferential treatment to minority groups who have suffered
discrimination on an industry-wide level. Mandating that minorities
constitute ten percent of the recipients of certain grant-in-aid mon-
ies, this provision is part of "an overall federal scheme to assist mi-
nority business enterprises which have traditionally been excluded
from industry."9 2 Stressing Congress' power to make general indus-
try-wide findings of discrimination and impose appropriate reme-
dies, courts have upheld the minority business enterprise provision
even in the absence of specific findings of intentional discrimina-
tion.93 The Supreme Court may soon have occasion to determine
the ultimate validity of this provision.
94
C Voluntary Programs Utilized to Maintain Balance
Weber specifically proscribes only one justification for volun-
tary affirmative action. An employer may not accord preferential
treatment to minorities for the sole purpose of maintaining statistical
balance.95 The impact of this stern prohibition is tempered by a con-
sideration of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.96 Al-
87. "Every decision upholding the requirement of preferential hiring under the authority
of Exec. Order No. 11246 . . . has emphasized the existence of previous discrimination as a
predicate for the imposition of a preferential remedy." 438 U.S. at 301-02 n.40.
88. Id. at 353-55 n.28. Justice Brennan pointed out that Congress, in enacting the 1972
amendments to Title VII, declined to interfere with the executive order. He further noted that
both congressional and lower court approval of the executive order signalled approval of its
aims. Id.
89. Id. at 340-42 n.17, 362.
90. Id. at 342 n.17.
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (West Supp. 1979).
92. Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 951 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 573 F.2d
811 (3d Cir. 1978).
93. See Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338
(D.R.I. 1978). Butsee Wright Farms Constr. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977) (minor-
ity business enterprise provision violative of equal protection in that minority businesses had
not suffered discrimination in Vermont).
94. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979)
(editorial summary of argument before Court found at 48 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979)).
95. 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979).
96. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
though the Bakke Court ultimately chose to condemn the medical
school's minority admissions quota, a majority of the Court noted
that race may serve as a factor in admissions determinations.97 A
university's "wide discretion""8 in evaluating applicants encom-
passes the attainment of a diverse student body as a legitimate goal.
Significantly, Bakke's recognition of a university's "wide discretion"
parallels Weber's recognition of an employer's "traditional business
freedom."9 9 Thus, even in the absence of prior discrimination, Title
VII may permit an employer to consider an applicant's minority sta-
tus as one of several factors positively influencing the hiring deci-
sion. Obviously, this consideration of minority status may neither
constitute the controlling factor nor manifest itself in quota form. By
regarding minority status as a positive factor, an employer may,
however, be able to maintain a relatively balanced work force with-
out violating Title VII.
IV. Conclusion
In United Steelworkers v. Weber"° the Supreme Court force-
fully legitimized voluntary affirmative action. Title VII clearly en-
courages employers to initiate suitable remedial programs. At the
same time, employers need not confess specific instances of prior dis-
crimination. At the least, Weber establishes that a statistical imbal-
ance in a traditionally segregated job classification justifies a
moderate preferential program.
Although Weber resolves one major question, the decision also
generates additional questions. By assuming a firm position, Weber
has brought Title VII into potential conflict with equal protection. A
recent Supreme Court case stresses that unintentional discrimina-
tion, which impacts negatively on certain minority groups, is not vio-
lative of equal protection.' 0 Thus, under the present state of the
law, a court could simultaneously uphold a preferential affirmative
97. Justice Powell specifically agreed with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Black-
mun that "race may be taken into account as a factor in an admissions program." Id. at 296
n.36. Justice Powell stressed, however, that race may not constitute the controlling factor. Id.
at 311-15.
98. Id. at 314.
99. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
100. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
101. In Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979), the Court held that a Massachu-
setts statute granting preference to veterans in state employment did not unconstitutionally
discriminate against women. Although the Armed Services have traditionally limited the
number of women enlistees, the Court found that the disparate impact of the statute, in the
absence of intentional discrimination, did not violate equal protection: "purposeful discrimi-
nation is 'the condition that offends the Constitution.'" Id. at 2293.
The Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions, acknowledged the schism between
Title VII and equal protection standards. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Gedulig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). A recent fifth circuit case explored this schism, concluding that
intentional discrimination is not a necessary element of a Title VII suit brought against a
governmental employer; the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact more exact-
action program under Title VII and conclude that non-minority em-
ployees have suffered reverse discrimination under equal protec-
tion. 
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In addition, Weber fails to identify the point at which permissi-
ble affirmative action becomes impermissible reverse discrimination.
Weber merely establishes that the Kaiser program is clearly permis-
sible. Future decisions will be necessary to chart the exact line of
demarcation. For the present, Weber stands as the first, and cer-
tainly the most crucial, step in the delineation of the boundaries of
voluntary affirmative action under Title VII.
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ing safeguards than those constitutionally provided. Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1979).
102. Sears, Roebuck and Company recently brought suit in district court seeking a court
order that would force the government to coordinate its equal opportunities laws and pro-
grams. Although the court dismissed the suit, maintaining that it did not present a case or
controversy, the questions raised are pressing ones. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney Gen.,
47 U.S.L.W. 2734 (D.D.C. May 22, 1979).

